geographic history. Unfortunately, the two countries also share a significant national security threat, that of drug trafficking organizations (DTO). DTOs are extremely violent organizations that are the largest suppliers of illegal drugs to Americans. The ends, ways and means of DTOs have significant negative implications on both countries.
While DTOs often operate in the same manner as terrorist and insurgent groups, the U.S. government identifies DTOs as transnational criminal organizations due to the fact that the DTOs ends are financial as opposed to ideological or political. Using an interagency, or "whole of government", strategy, the U.S. government conducts a bilateral campaign aimed at reducing the affects of DTOs. Finally, this approach best incorporates all elements of national power aimed at reducing the demand for illegal drugs and countering the threat from DTOs to one manageable at the lowest levels of government.
Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations: Matching Strategy to Threat
Organized criminal organizations, terror groups, and insurgents have at least one trait in common: the use of violence as one of multiple ways to attain their stated ends. 1 The ends for an organized crime organization are different from the ends for a terrorist group, financial as opposed to ideology for example. These differences in ends warrant different strategies by the United States designed to stop the distinct organizations, their attendant violence, and negative effects on the U.S. population. Despite statements by security and policy experts as well as U.S. government officials describing drug cartel violence in Mexico as an insurgency or terrorism, 2 the United States defines cartels, known as Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO), as criminal organizations. In order to counter DTO effects on American citizens, the U.S. government developed and implemented a balanced strategy that utilizes the diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements of national power. 3 Additionally, the strategy incorporates legal, law enforcement, and intelligence means to provide a whole of government approach to ensure the protection of U.S. enduring and national interests.
The negative impacts of Mexican DTOs on the United States' national security, economy, and lives of countless Americans are felt daily across the U.S. The 2010
National Security Strategy identifies safeguarding American citizens as the first of America's enduring interests. Additionally, the strategy states that transnational criminal threats, also called Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), of which DTOs are a form, pose "a significant national security challenge to the United States and all of our partner countries." 4 The U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime states these criminal networks are growing and diversifying into multi-dimensional threats to U.S.
national interests. Among others, the regions linked to DTOs include: 1) corruption in Mexico; 2) crimeterror-insurgency nexus; 3) expansion of drug trafficking; and 4) trafficking of weapons and persons. 6 For the scope of this paper, the primary focus is on drug trafficking, although later discussions of strategy and use of the elements of national power reflect ways to tackle each of these areas.
According to the Department of Justice's National Drug Intelligence Center, in
2009-2010 Mexican DTOs had a presence in more than 1000 American cities. 7 Although the U.S. government conducts an interagency, or "whole of government" strategy to halt the flow of illegal drugs along the Mexico-U.S. border, 8 Mexican-based DTOs continue to provide the majority of illicit drugs to U.S. consumers. 9 The economic impact of drug trafficking and use in the U.S. is estimated at close to $200 billion annually, 10 and the use of illicit drugs in the U.S. continues to rise despite the nearly $1 trillion spent fighting the war on drugs since the war's inception in 1971.
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The U.S. is involved on many levels to halt DTO's access and impacts to and within the U.S. Additionally, as Dr. Paul Kan states, the ideological or political motivations of insurgents and terrorists often tend to support negotiations at some point in a conflict. 38 With DTOs ends aligned with financial gain and not political positioning, negotiation is not an option.
Thus, DTOs more closely resemble organized crime organizations, albeit ones whose violent actions may resemble an insurgency or terrorist organization.
With DTOs ends aligned with financial gain instead of political or ideological ends, it appears that DTOs fit better in the classification of organized crime, both as who they are and what they do. Organized crime is defined by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as "any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities." 39 Jay Albanese defines organized crime as "a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand." 40 and attempt to influence government, financial gain is their end. 42 The ends of the U.S.
are to reduce TOC, and in turn reduce DTOs, from a threat to national security to one that local and regional officials are able to handle on the level of public safety. organizations. 44 Ultimately, in order to defeat DTOs, the strategy is designed to ensure the global community is fully aware of and ready to counter the threats they pose. Moreover, through various ways the strategy seeks to deprive DTOs of their means, and reduce the overall threat DTOs are able to pose. 45 Additionally, the U.S. is establishing an interagency Threat Mitigating Working Group to provide a whole of government approach to address numerous types of threats that DTOs pose. 46 This working group is designed to integrate and synchronize all elements of national power.
The first priority action for the strategy is acknowledging that the U.S. shares responsibility for illegal drugs and drug violence in the U.S. and Mexico. 47 The strategy states that demand for illegal drugs within the U.S. is a major driver for the existence of DTOs. As discussed below, stopping the demand for illegal drugs is designed to ultimately drive down the supply coming into the U.S. Additionally, the strategy emphasizes the U.S. effort to reduce the flow of illegal weapons from the U.S. into
Mexico. These weapons allow the DTOs to hold and grow power and influence over the population, government, and security forces. Without the flow of U.S. weapons DTOs will be unable to maintain their current levels of violence. Without the capacity for extreme levels of violence, the power and influence that DTOs wield over the people and government decreases, as well as their ability to maintain current levels of trafficking. Finally, the strategy puts in place efforts to work with Mexican officials to combat corruption on both sides of the border, as well as enhance law enforcement capabilities and strengthen the rule of law within Mexico. 48 The second priority action of the strategy is to enhance intelligence and information sharing. 49 This starts internally to the U.S. and expands out to include sharing of intelligence and information with Mexico. The intent is Mexico and the U.S.
share the same common operating picture with regard to DTO operations on both sides of the border. The strategy makes it possible for organizations such as the Drug Enforcement Administration-led Special Operations Division, including Federal law enforcement agencies, Department of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and international law enforcement agencies, to cooperate in attacks on the DTOs command and control capabilities. 50 The third priority action 51 is to protect the financial system against DTOs. For the fight against DTOs, the focus of this action is to identify and stop the ways in which DTOs move, hide and increase profits from drug trafficking. Additionally, emphasis is placed on working with the private sector to assist in identifying and stopping DTOs movement and hiding of drug profits.
The fourth priority action is to strengthen investigations, interdiction, and prosecutions through collaborative targeting of DTOs. 52 Where lethal targeting of DTO leadership through military or law enforcement means generally focuses on one target at a time, this priority action aims criminal investigations at an entire criminal network.
53
With regard to interdiction, the strategy is designed to hinder the DTO's ability to access their product, money, trafficking infrastructure, and their enabling means.
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The fifth priority action focuses on drug trafficking and DTOs facilitation of other transnational threats. As with the fourth priority, this portion of the strategy maintains the focus on DTO leadership, production, and infrastructure. 55 The intent is that by collecting and sharing the maximum amount of intelligence on the network as a whole, targeting effectiveness increases. By focusing as well on DTO links to other transnational threats, the U.S. maintains vigilant watch on the potential for the Mexican DTO-terror nexus discussed earlier.
The final priority action is the building of international capacity, cooperation, and partnerships. 56 Linked to the first priority action of acknowledging the U.S. share of the responsibility for the problems associated with DTOs, the final action emphasizes the importance of working with Mexico to defeat DTOs. Emphasis is placed on building the legal and law enforcement capabilities of international partners, including Mexico, to bolster the rule of law. 57 Finally, this priority action finalizes the law enforcement cooperation outlined in the U.S.-Mexico 21 st Century Border Action Plan, specifically joint assessment of threats and focus for U.S. and Mexican law enforcement operations. 58 The 2012 National Drug Control Strategy continues earlier Obama administration's efforts emphasizing the reduction of demand for drugs within the U.S.
as the focus of the strategy. Prevention and treatment receive the most funding, $10.1 billion, with law enforcement, interdiction, and international programs receiving $15.1 billion combined. 59 Additionally, the strategy calls for improved intelligence and information sharing from the National to local levels. Finally, the strategy calls for the strengthening of the strategic partnership with Mexico, improving understanding of 14 DTOs weaknesses, disrupting drug trafficking in the transit zones, and targeting DTO leadership and finances. 60 There is little argument that the demand for illegal drugs in the U.S. is a significant driving force behind DTOs violence and drug-related crime. As President
Obama stated in a joint press conference with Mexican President Calderon in 2011,
As part of our new drug control strategy, we are focused on reducing the demand for drugs through education, prevention and treatment...We are very mindful that the battle President Calderón is fighting…is not just his battle; it's also ours. We have to take responsibility just as he is. 61 In the effort to reduce demand, the intent of the U.S. strategy is to provide a focus on prevention of drug use in the youth population, increase prevention awareness in the workplace, and better help communities develop and implement prevention practices. In order to achieve the aforementioned end of reducing DTOs from a national security threat to one managed as a public safety issue, the U.S. must use the traditional DIME 71 elements of national power, as well as the legal, law enforcement, and intelligence instruments of power to ensure a balanced and effective approach. The U.S. must work shoulder to shoulder with Mexico on these initiatives. Only by sharing intelligence on DTOs, strengthening Mexican law enforcement capacity and capability, strengthening the rule of law to capture and incarcerate, and strengthening transparency to reduce corruption can DTO influence truly begin to be reduced.
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The informational element of national power must be woven into the majority of actions taken by Mexico and the U.S. DTOs movement of bulk cash, DTOs will find ways to move profits in other methods.
These methods could include prepaid credit and debit cards, digital currencies, and online role-playing games that allow movement of funds. 77 The U.S. must work with the private sector to develop the means to identify and stop these new methods of transferring funds. Already in place, the Beyond Merida Initiative is the essential instrument of power within the economic element of national power. Off to a slow start in 2008 but revitalized in 2010, and providing close to $2 billion to Mexico since implementation, this is an effort that the U.S. congress must continue to fund and enforce if institutional reforms are to take hold in Mexico.
Conclusion
Mexico is a partner like no other to the U.S. Our shared border, as well as longstanding historical, social, cultural, and economic ties, mandate that the two countries work together to reduce and eventually end DTO influence in both countries. With a presence estimated in more than 1000 U.S. cities 78 
